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Abstract

Current security systems are designed to prevent foreseeable attacks. Those security
systems do not prevent effectively the more emergent types of attacks, like a botnet, whose
presence and behavior is difficult to predict. In order to predominate those types of
attacks, we advocate an adaptive security approach based on the animal immune system.
But since those sophisticated attacks can also be directed at the security systems
themselves, leading to computer immunodeficiency, like HIV, in this paper we propose a
protocol that protects the immune system itself. This approach discriminates between
attacks on the security systems, which are part of the computer immune system, and
attacks on other vital computer systems in an information infrastructure.
Keywords: Self-organization, complex adaptive systems, information security, immune
system.

1 Introduction
In large-scale information systems complexity is more and more challenging security
policies. Not only are those systems large, but also distributed and interwoven. Besides
that they are also rapidly changing and have thus a dynamic structure due to
organizational and technological factors. As such changes in one infrastructure may have
effect on the other infrastructures. It is even so that initially small flaws in one
infrastructure could result in amplified problems in other dependent infrastructures
(butterfly effect) and bounce back. The consequence is that complexity increases,
manageability decreases and vulnerability of such interwoven infrastructures increases.
Those large conglomerates of infrastructures are sometimes that complex that their total
reaction to certain local distortions becomes even unpredictable (Amin 2000). This is a
growing concern, since societies depend in business and in private occasions more than
ever on those conglomerate information systems, i.e. information infrastructures.
Information infrastructures that provide critical services to physical critical
infrastructures, like roads and electricity, are referred to as critical information
infrastructures (CII).
A CII could be an extranet of a bank, a WAN of a multinational, traffic control
information systems or even (a part of) the Internet. The term critical infrastructure is
here used to identify a chain of (sub)systems, the failure of which might cause high direct
and/or indirect social, economical or ecological damage. A CII consists of many
(sub)systems, or computing entities (CE’s), with different functions. The role of a
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security CE’s in CII is crucial since all the security services that make the rest of the
infrastructure dependable, arise in these nodes. We will call those security CE’s that
contribute to providing one or more of the security services, i.e. identification,
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation, security distribution centers
(SDC’s).
Current SDC’s, like virus scanners, intrusion detection systems, authentication servers
and firewalls, are designed to repel foreseeable, i.e. “known” and “definable” attacks.
Known means that its defense strategy is based on ex-post data and historically
determined anomalies. Definable means that attacks are determinable in time (when?)
and number (how many?). Current SDC’s in such CII do not meet in time the required
adjustments to unforeseen
and emergent security attacks. Acknowledging this
shortcoming, many organizations assure availability of their vulnerable ICT systems, and
thus also their SDC’s, by employing redundancy techniques (Barbour et al 1989;
Hiltunen et al 2003; Reiter 1994; Veríssimo et al 2000;Gong 1993). Those measures are a
posteriori and do not prevent attacks.
Because those traditional approaches are not designed to repel those complex attacks, in
this paper we want to explore unconventional and risky alternatives instead of building
upon existing and convenient security architectures: emergent complex problems require
adaptive solutions. Since biology is an inexhaustible source of inspiration for many
researches in many disciplines that apply or deal with emergent behavior, our security
approach is, like many others (Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997; Goel et al 2003), also
based on the animal immune system (AIS). This work differs however from those works
on at least two points. First, those other works exploit the AIS to protect other functional
CE’s (cells) of the CII (body) than the SDC’s. Sophisticated emergent attacks directed at
SDC’s of the AIS self, called HIV attacks, are not prevented. The in this paper proposed
protocol does take them also into consideration. Second, those other works usually
exploit the recognition technique of the AIS to develop better intrusion detection systems
and as such can block more attacks effectively, but still not all attacks. Our protocol
complements those AIS-based approaches, since it also takes care of the missed, and thus
successfully penetrated, attacks. Conclusively, other works either do not focus on security
systems (Amin 2000; George et al 2003; Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997; Goel et al
2003) or do not clear effectively the missed attacks (Kephart 1995; Forrest et al 1997;
Goel et al 2003) or are not adaptive (Barbour et al 1989; Hiltunen et al 2003; Reiter
1994;Veríssimo et al 2000; Gong 1993).

2 Complex adaptive systems
Complexity in computer science can be defined as the level in difficulty in solving
mathematically posed problems as measured by the time, number of steps or arithmetic
operations, or memory space required. Understanding this complexity is not always
possible as it goes beyond our mental capacities, so that solutions to control the
conglomerate infrastructure seem rather unachievable. Consider the Internet: despite that
the fact that it is the result of human effort, we are still not capable of understanding its
behavior, not to mention to master it (Van Best 2005).
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But complexity, as one of the culprits that increases vulnerability, has also a positive
side effect. The many ‘dumb’ bees, for example, are able to architecture a most complex
honeycomb with hexagonal cells. More complex life forms like the human body depict a
conglomerate of many bio-compartments. Those biological systems in the human body
contain countless cells with many differentiated tasks to maintain the numerous functions
of the body, like self-healing of wounds, the AIS against pathological diseases and so on.
Obviously, by letting a sample of specialized cells perform their specific and yet simple
tasks they manage together an aggregated complex task. Although the result of this
complex and intelligent behavior is not intended by each single cell and none of them
might be aware of this meta- goal, yet it is the result of their collaboration. We consider
therefore a complex adaptive system (CAS) as a collection of interdependent rulefollowing agents with interactions resulting in system-wide patterns across the group. The
richness and volume of these interactions allow a complex system as a whole to undergo
spontaneous self-organization. Self-organization is the emergence of a patterned outcome
that no individual had planned, i.e. emergent behavior of the system. A characteristic is
that no agent needs to be aware of the existence of the total space. Each CE knows at
most what kind of capabilities it has and how it can look for relevant information in the
environment. Properties of a CAS are (Wilinsky et al 1999): emergent behavior,
adaptation, specialization, dynamic change, decentralization, competition and
cooperation. Our positive perception of complexity, in which complexity is rather
exploited to solve problems, is supported by other groups like the Santa Fe Institute
(Langton et al 1992; Dooley et al 1995; Dooley 1997). As such in the next sections we
will discuss a case where the AIS serves as input for information security problems.

3 An analogy from the animal immune system
Given the more sophisticated type of attacks within the increased complexity of
infrastructures we foresee more opportunities in using complexity by means of a CAS to
oppose security threats. We expect that especially in the field of computer security we
can learn from the self-healing property of the human body to deal with many complex
security problems in distributed systems. Particularly, the AIS will be considered to
inspire us towards solutions as the main function of the AIS is to withstand foreign
micro-organisms and to counter attack those who managed to penetrate the body.
The animal immune response system
Acknowledging that the body of vertebrates is immensely complex and the fact that it is
capable of controlling this complexity autonomously is something we can learn from to
master our problems. Given the motivation of one cell to survive (Dawkins 1989) and the
aimed behavior of an SDC, also to survive, we see reasons to learn from the AIS.
The body of vertebrates consists of a conglomerate of many bio-compartments. Those
biological systems in the body contain countless cells with many differentiated tasks to
maintain the numerous functions of the body, like self-healing of wounds, the AIS
against pathological diseases and so on. By letting a sample of specialized cells to
perform their specific and yet simple tasks they manage together an aggregated complex
task. Although the outcome of this complex and intelligent behavior is not aimed by each
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single cell and none of them might be aware of this meta- goal, yet it is the aggregated
result of their collaboration. The analogy would be that clustered computers clear failures
like the AIS is doing with antigens by seamless collaboration. In this section we aim at
finding ideas and requirements for achieving the research goal to build a security defense
system.
The AIS is a complex network of closely cooperating cells and molecules, performing
their functions with other organ systems. Its primary task is the induction and regulation
of immunity to pathogens, such as bacteria, viruses and other micro-organisms, and to
tumors (Roitt et al 2001). Host defences include both physiologic barriers and
immunological responses. Skin and mucous membranes provide the first line of defence.
Immune defences consist of innate and adaptive response system. The mechanism for the
innate immunity is always present and comes rapidly into action. It provides a coarsegrained defence system that usually does not hold for a long time. Because of its general
recognition system many pathogens are able to pass by this weak access control. The
adaptive immunity system in contrast is capable of recognizing many specific pathogens
and forms as such a fine-grained access control. Besides that, it is capable of building
new antibody cells against new pathogens, although this process costs time. While both
responses are not mutually exclusive, they provide distinctly different advantages for
dealing with pathogenic organisms. As a description of the specific working of the
overall AIS would surpass the goal of this section we will limit us to one specific type of
collaboration between some specific cells (among others from (Perham 2000; Roitt et al
2001).
Many types of white blood cells, like the small T- and B-cells (lymphocytes),
originated in the bone marrow, play during their maturation in the body an important
role in dismantling the pathogens. After recognition of the antigens the B-cells are
cloned and dispatched through the lymphatic system to inform and to mobilize other
lymphocytes. As such the lymphatic system facilitates the communication service by
recirculating the lymphocytes and antibodies through the body. In the meanwhile
other cloned B-cells bind to the antigens to mark them and a few of them do nothing
as they function as memory cells for immediate recognition in future invasions. The
killer (or cytotoxic) T-cells trace those marked pathogens, perforate infected cells and
kill the body’s own cells that have been evaded by activating programmed cell death.
Ultimately, the phagocytic cells, like macrophage and neutrophil, trace the remaining
marked micro-organisms. After opsonization (coating) or neutralization they are
absorbed and destroyed.
The seamless and dependent collaboration between the different cells appears in many
phases, like for example between the T- and B-cells. Through a process of cloning,
specific B-cells are stimulated to proliferate and differentiate to bind the antigens.
Although B cells are able to recognize antigen, they are unable to proliferate and
differentiate unless triggered by the action of T-cells.
In order for the T-cells to become stimulated to release lymphokines, they must also
recognize specific antigens. However, while T-cells recognize antigen via their T-cell
receptors (T-helper cells CD4+), they can only do so in the context of the antigenpresenting cells (APCs). Several types of cells may serve the APC function, like the
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macrophage and dendritic cells, but also the B-cell self. When APC bind antigen, the
antigen becomes internalized, processed and expressed on the surface of the APC.
This specific expression is now recognized by T-helper cells so that they can release a
trigger for the B-cells.
There two main types of T-cells: the helper T-cell and the killer cytotoxic T-cell. There
two main types of T-helper cells: those that help the B-cells (Th2) and those that help the
cytotoxic T-cells (Th1). The effect of HIV on the immune system is the result of
gradually eliminating the Th1 and Th2 helper T-cells. The immune system gradually
looses its functionality until it is malicious and/or malfunctioning.

The application
The body consists of many organ systems to keep the body healthy. Think of the straining
function of toxic substances by the liver or the skin and mucous membranes that provide
the first line of defense against pathogens. Above this, the immune response system
provides the innate and adaptive response system. The T- and B- cells are analogously
the SDC’s in CII. Similar to the elimination of the Th1 and Th2 helper T-cell subpopulations by the HIV in a body, in CII the SCD’s can be eliminated by malware with
emergent behavior (HIV attacks).
Focusing on the last one, the immune response system is apparently also specific,
adaptive and has a memory for protecting and healing the body. From the previous we
can derive some ideas about realizing the aimed defense system as a CAS. The immune
response system depicts most of all a sophisticated way of self-organization by
collaborating individual cells. Requirements for achieving this self-organization principle
can be derived from the working of the cells in the AIS. The cells
-

have specific internal motivators to act, that can be triggered by external events,
are selfish (Dawkins 1989),
are not necessarily aware of the consequence of their behavior,
have limited knowledge of other cells,
perceive other cells either as correct or compromised,
are able to find and communicate with helper cells,
are able to detect and isolate intruders and defect cells,
can be increased in number by cloning,
are able to distinguish between common and rare invasions,
can rely on a collective memory about intruders.

Considering this adaptive, specialized, decentralized and cooperative behavior of cells,
we claim that: attributing SDC’s with the similar characteristics as the animal immune
cells will enable them together to build innate and adaptive immunity such that HIV
attacks can resisted.

4 Overview of the approach
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In this section the so-called ‘escapability’ behavior of an endangered SDC will be
introduced. We will draw an impression of how a distributed defense system, as a result
of the collaboration of the individual nodes, should deal with infected SDC’s. In this
approach the adaptive system takes also care of HIV attacks.
The body
Assume a space in which dozens of entities want to collaborate with each other
(universities, naval, etc), but are unknown and thus by default initially do not trust each
other. That means that they are logically tied to each other in a kind of grid, but due to the
prisoners dilemma they do not act. A lot of effort is put therefore to establish a trust
centre and to point out one of the members as a trusted point of reference to mediate
security services (authentication/ key server), i.e. SDC. The essential requirement is that
all the other members agree on and authorize this particular member. Once this is done all
the members can rely on the trust centre for confirming identities and distributing keys.
When this trust centre collapses or starts malfunctioning this would be disastrous for the
whole group. The establishment of a new trust centre would be inevitable when the trust
centre cannot be recovered properly or/and on time. Establishing a trust centre between
unknown entities is one of the most difficult and costly things in the security domain, as
it requires not only technical means but also social and sometimes political means
(agreements, treaties). Therefore, a once established trust service should ideally be
carried on without any process disjunction, regardless the vitality of the hosting trust
base.

The innate response system
Assume now that there are two SDC’s in that space that issue trust (i.e. certificates or
keys), like Kerberos does (Neuman 1994). An SDC knows only one operation mode:
common session security mode. In the common session mode, an SDC reacts as a leader
of clients immediately on known requests from clients and known security attacks from
outside by common security measures (firewalls, IDS, etc). Each SDC takes care of the
distribution of keys within its own group. If an object wants to communicate with another
object, the SDC mediates trust by distributing keys. In figure 1 two groups are depicted,
lead by SDC1 and SDC2. In fig a object (x,y) = (2,3) can start therefore communication
with object (3,2) or with an object from another group like (3,3). In the latter one it is
required that both SDC’s have a trust relationship. In figure b a situation is depicted in
which trust center (2,2) has formed a new group after a leaving member (2,3) and new
joining members ((1,3);(2,4)). However, when a trust center like (4,3) collapses due to
unknown and unexpected failures then all the group members become useless orphans (at
least for a certain crucial moment) as they are not trusted and secured. Only CE (x,y) =
(3,2) remains secure and trusted due to his subscription to a second SDC, i.e. SDC1. Any
requests for interaction will be rejected, since there is no trust center to verify their
identity and to check permissions. This is depicted in figure c.
The three figures depict how a conventional SDC’s react on a) common client requests b)
client group behaviour and c) SDC failures. In the latter, most clients become orphans.
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Figure 1. Conventional SDC’s
The adaptive response system
Assume now that an SDC distinguishes two operation modes: common session security
mode and the survivability mode. In the survivability mode, the SDC serves clients but
participates also in a resource sharing pool. As such it reacts to unknown failures
(internally or from outside) also immediately, but now by using superfluous capacity of
one of the other CE’s in this trust pool. Assume now that SDC1 has formed a pool with
SDC2 and CE(3,3); see Figure 2. According to the metempsychosis principle the trust
authority must not bind permanently to any hardware architecture so that the SDC can
continue his tasks on another pool member. This mechanism should subsequently take
care of consolidating the state of trust, packaging and launching the trust package. This
trust package is the trust token that should contain the essential unique secret
characteristics. In figure 2b the trust authority at (4,3) escapes to one of its neighbors
(3,3) and recovers (reincarnates) there, like is explained for object volatility, so that the
group of clients remains undisturbed after all. By doing so, this mechanism takes care of
the reliability and availability of the trust service. The interesting thing is that with this
approach trust remains during the security session centralized, but on attack it distributes
and benefits from a decentralized approach as it can practically hop to any collaborating
peer.
It is obvious that the larger the network and thus the more collaborating CE’s there are,
the metempsychosis principle and the principle of self-organization can provide perpetual
availability of security services by continuously hopping away and reincarnation. Besides
that in this mode the SDC escapes it builds internally also resistance by learning from the
failure or type of attack. As for example, in a simple form a virus detection system is
updated with the new type of virus. The corrupted SDC is isolated by the other SDC’s.
They avoid any relation further with the corrupted SDC and multicast to the clients his
state of corruption.
The figures show how SDC’s, should react on failures, so that all clients remain served.
Collapsing SDC2 can continue his service by moving to one of his clients or to another SDC.
1
1

2

3

SDC1
SDC1+ SDC2

3

SDC2

SDC2
5
y

Clients

a. SDC2 collapses
SDC 2

b. Escaped
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Figure 2. Escaping SDC’s

5 Definition of security as a CAS
In order to characterize a SDC as a CAS we need to define the assumptions and the
instruction set of each agent. In this case we choose a key distribution centre (KDC) as
the SDC, although others are instances possible.
Assumptions:
- A CE is an agent.
- An agent is either a client agent (Ac) or a KDC agent (Akdc).
- A Akdc can deliver key distribution services to Ac’s.
- An agent sees a limited set of other agents in the total space.
- An Akdc shares with two ore more other Akdc’s a trust relationship.
- An agent is not aware of the consequences of his actions for the overall system.
- An agent perceives only availability and trustworthiness of other agents.
- An agent has a memory system, i.e. it can store basic information about other agents.
- An agent is able to send and receive messages.
- An agent is either triggered by an explicit message or by a faulty expected message from other
agents.
- An external certification authority (CA) is ad hoc present (possibly also as a result of previous
case).
- The Akdc have signed certificates to verify their asymmetric key pair and their
trustworthiness 4.
- Each Akdc is frequently suffering from denial of service attacks, but not all at the same time.

Instruction set
Three instruction sets keep the organism healthy: the innate, the adaptive and the
common response system. The three instruction sets are called Medusa. The innate refers
in our information infrastructures to the front end security systems, like intrusion
detection and firewalls. The common security system refers to the service of the regarded
SDC, i.e. a KDC. Both, front end security systems and KDC, will not be discussed
further, since they are exiting technologies. The instruction set for the adaptive response
systems, however, is not existing and will be given in the following instruction set. The
next autonomous actions for each agent separately in the CAS enable the SDC service to
be resilient by continuously hopping away from the attacked Akdc.
0. Most Ac’s: subscribe by sending a secret s to one of the Akdc’s (using his public key)
based on his trustworthiness.
2. Akdc: creates and sends on request symmetric keys to Ac’s.
3. Akdc: frequently creates tokens t of those secrets s 5.
4. Akdc: frequently sends t and a list of his preferred successors (SL) to those successor
Akdc’s (SAkdc’s).
5. SAkdc’s: check availability of suffering Akdc.
While an Akdc is DOS attacked do:
6. Successor Akdc’s: send declaration of death of harmed Akdc to each other.
If majority agrees on death:
4
5

In the so-called extension block of the certificate (X.509 vs.3 or SPKI format).
Token = share, according to Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm
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7. SAkdc’s: send their t to first ranked SAkdc on SL.
8. SAkdc: reconstructs the secrets of the clients.
9. SAkdc: refreshes and sends the new secrets to the clients.
10. Go to 2 with Akdc = SAkdc.

This instruction set takes care of continuously replicating the security service and letting
it resurrect on another host Akdc after a DOS attack. The new host Akdc functions as a
temporary carriage, i.e. execution platform, until he is also attacked. This mechanism lets
the security service to be independent of the resources of a particular Akdc. The clients
are not necessarily aware of this host transition, since the trust relationship is based on the
shared secret s and not on the identity of the Akdc. A detailed description of an applied
instruction set can be found in (Daskapan 2006).
DOS attack
Hop 1

tokens

Hop 2

Hop 3

KDC
resources
Akdc 1

Akdc N
Akdc 2

Figure 3. Continuous hopping away security services

6 Test
Preliminary tests have been conducted using also here a discrete event simulator NS+
with C++/TCL on Linux (Fall et al 2000). The aim is to see if resilience of front-end
SDC’s by applying CAS approach of participating SDC’s is improved.

The test
The tests were performed up to 100 nodes of a CII in a WAN topology. In our test model
we assume an existing botnet that tries to jeopardize our CII. The SDC’s in the CII were
exposed to multiple distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) from the botnet to cause
system failures. The particular type of DDOS attack used for this scenario was the buffer
overflow DDOS (Chang 2002). In the simulation model we assume that the SDC is a key
distribution centre where the leader has a buffer for session key requests. This buffer will
be exploited in this scenario. Normally, the leader will process requests faster than it
receives but for this scenario, clients are instructed to send requests at a much faster rate
so that the leader inevitably will collapse. To test survivability multiple consecutive
DDOS attacks were planned.
The result
The test was first run with 6 participating SDC’s. Each SDC had a relation with two other
SDC’s, such that all the SDC’s were directly or indirectly connected. DDOS attacks were
executed then at any first one and subsequently at his successor and so on. Medusa was in
this case able to resurrect the security service three times. The reason for that is that a
majority of SDC’s must remain honest to clear the embedded voting algorithms reliably.
We have conducted this test with larger numbers. It appears that when we increase the
number of participating SDC’s also the number of attacks it can resist increases.
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Many other tests were also carried out with different types of networks and different
levels of trustworthiness of the agents. Also the simulation model was validated and
security of the protocol was verified. Those detailed tests are out of the scope of this
paper, but can be found in (Wiechers et al 2004; Wiechers et al 2005).

7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have derived ideas from the animal immune system to build an adaptive
security defense system. This defense system discriminates between attacks on the
security systems, which are part of the computer immune system, and attacks on other
vital computer systems in an information infrastructure. The preliminary tests depicted
that the claim of the defence system to be adaptive and to resist multiple attacks, even on
the security systems self, can be met. In our future work we intend to apply more
concepts from biological systems and to improve this initial protocol.
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